National practice

IEC 62305 in Greece

Greece runs the same IEC 62305-2:2024 method as everywhere else, with one recorded departure that is blanket rather than selective: the thunderstorm warning system factor P_TWS is 1 for all cases.

Lightning over a European city square at night, the setting for a national application of IEC 62305

Greece applies the IEC 62305-2 risk method unchanged, with one recorded departure that reaches further than most: the thunderstorm warning system factor PTWS is 1 for all cases.

The standard says so in its own text. IEC 62305-2:2024 carries a list of differing practices in its foreword, at printed p.9, and the Greek entry records that Greece takes PTWS as 1 in every case. The scope is the point: every case. The Greek rule is blanket, where the German rule on the same factor is written per risk component.

This page sets out what PTWS is, which six probabilities carry it directly and how it reaches three more components through the presence factor, what holding it at 1 does to a result and in which direction, and how the blanket form differs from Germany's. Everything cites the clause, equation or table it comes from, because a parameter rule you cannot trace is a parameter rule you cannot defend in a review.

The designation

Which publication governs in Greece

Greece reaches IEC 62305 the way its neighbours do. CENELEC adopts the international standard as EN IEC 62305, and the Greek national body, ELOT, publishes that text under a national reference. For the risk management part that reference is ΕΛΟΤ EN IEC 62305-2:2024. The clauses, the risk components and the equations come across unchanged, which is why a Greek specification and an international one describe the same method.

The naming is worth getting right on a document. The current series is IEC 62305 and its adoptions carry the IEC number in their designation, as in EN IEC 62305. A bare EN 62305 refers to the superseded series, Parts 1, 3 and 4 from 2011 and Part 2 from 2012, and is not the standard a current assessment is built to. If a specification you have been handed names that number, resolve which edition is actually intended before you calculate, because the edition decides the method.

None of this changes the method. The reference number tells you which national publication governs; the differing practices list tells you what that country changes. For Greece the answer to the first is the European adoption, and to the second it is PTWS. For the wider picture of how adoption works, see IEC 62305 around the world.

The parameter

What PTWS is and where it enters

A probability term from Annex B. It enters six damage probabilities directly and reaches three more components through the presence factor. Knowing both routes is what tells you where the Greek rule bites.

Clause B.2 NOTE 1

The factor

PTWS is the thunderstorm warning system factor: the probability that the system misses a lightning event in the area it watches. Clause B.1 NOTE 2 treats a warning that comes too late to act on as no warning. Clause B.2 NOTE 1 takes PTWS as 1 when there is no warning system, when evacuation is not assured, or when the maker gives no failure to warn ratio (FTWR). Selecting a value below 1 is what claims credit for the system.

Six equations

Where it appears

PTWS is a multiplicative term in PAT, equation (B.2), PAD, equation (B.3), PU, equation (B.10), PV, equation (B.11), PW, equation (B.12) and PZ, equation (B.13). Those six probabilities drive the risk components RAT, RAD, RU, RV, RW and RZ.

Equation (B.14) NOTE 2

Where it enters indirectly

Equations (B.4) PB, (B.5) PC and (B.6) PM carry no PTWS term. But Table 3 builds RB1, RC1 and RM1 with the presence factor PP, and equation (B.14) NOTE 2 scales the presence time tz by PTWS where a warning lets people leave. Table E.3 footnote g also applies PTWS to losses inside the fence. If no evacuation credit was claimed, forcing PTWS to 1 leaves these three unchanged.

PTWS is a probability of failure, not of success. That sign convention is the one thing to hold on to when reading the rule, because it decides the direction of the effect: a larger PTWS means a less effective warning system, and 1 means no credit at all.

The effect

What holding PTWS at 1 does to a result

Because PTWS multiplies into the six probabilities above, fixing it at 1 leaves each of them at its unreduced value. The six components RAT, RAD, RU, RV, RW and RZ are therefore higher than the same building would produce under a plain IEC baseline calculation that declared a warning system, and the total risk R rises with them. Where the warning had also earned an evacuation credit through the presence factor PP, the loss of life parts of RB, RC and RM lose that credit as well.

The direction is one way in Lumex™. Holding PTWS at 1 removes any warning system credit, so the affected figures can only stay the same or rise. That direction comes from treating a value of 1 as no warning system at all, which is how the engine reads it; it is not a rule the standard states. So the Greek rule never rescues a structure that would otherwise fail; it can only push one that was passing over the line. That is the opposite of the Italian rule, which is more permissive than the baseline, and it is worth stating plainly because the two are often filed together as national departures without noticing they move in opposite directions.

The size of the difference is the size of the credit that was being claimed. A structure with no thunderstorm warning system already sits at PTWS = 1 under clause B.2 NOTE 1, so the Greek rule changes nothing for it. The rule bites exactly where a warning system has been declared and a value below 1 selected, and it scales with how much reduction that selection was taking out of the calculation.

The decision that can flip is whether protection is needed at all. The verdict in IEC 62305-2 is a comparison of the computed risk against the tolerable value. A building carried just under that line by a declared warning system sits above it once the credit is removed. So the departure is not a rounding detail. It can be the difference between a report that says no protection is required and one that specifies a lightning protection system.

Two countries, one factor

Why the Greek rule reaches further than the German one

Germany and Greece both force PTWS to 1. The entries are worded differently, and that wording changes which components are affected.

Greece, blanket

The entry records the value for all cases, so it reaches every probability carrying the term: PAT, PAD, PU, PV, PW and PZ. It also reaches RB, RC and RM through the presence factor PP. That includes the three injury components: RAT, RAD, which covers people on the structure hurt by a direct flash, and RU.

Germany, per component

The German entry names six components, the fire, internal system and line terms, and leaves the three injury terms alone: touch and step voltage near the structure (RAT), a person struck on the structure (RAD), and touch voltage from a connected line (RU). For RB, RC and RM the German rule acts through the presence factor PP and Table E.3 footnote g, since their own probabilities carry no PTWS term. The gap between the two countries is those three injury components.

The difference matters in both directions. Applying Greece's blanket rule to a German assessment would inflate RAT, RAD and RU, which the German entry deliberately leaves alone; applying Germany's component list to a Greek one would understate those same three. Overstating risk is as wrong as understating it, because both put a figure in a report that the governing rule did not produce. Germany's own departure on the fire provisions factor is covered in IEC 62305 in Germany.

Tolerable risk

RT is representative, not fixed by the standard

It is common to see the tolerable risk quoted as though IEC 62305-2 fixes it. It does not. Clause 7.3 NOTE 1 gives RT = 1 × 10⁻⁵ per year as a representative value of tolerable risk and adds that another value may be set once the case has been investigated in detail. The standard's introduction then lets national or local regulations fix RT, the tolerable frequency of damage FT, and the Annex A, B, C and E calculation rules and parameter values.

For Greece the standard records no national RT, and Lumex™ applies the representative 10⁻⁵ per year. If a project specification, a regulator or the authority having jurisdiction fixes another value, record it and compare the result against it outside the tool. That is a judgement to make and record at the start of a project, with whoever is entitled to make it, rather than a number to assume. It is also why a tool should resolve the tolerable value from the jurisdiction rather than carry it as a constant in the code.


Where to go next

Related reading

For how national adoption works generally, and which designation applies in other markets, see IEC 62305 around the world. For the method the Greek rule modifies, read the IEC 62305-2 risk assessment, and for the arithmetic itself see how IEC 62305 risk is calculated.

Three other national departures are set out in their own pages: IEC 62305 in Germany, where the fire provisions factor rp is 1 for all cases, IEC 62305 in Italy, where RL1 and RL2 are compared with the tolerable risk separately, and Annex D and Annex E in national practice, which covers the Netherlands and South Africa.


Where Lumex™ fits

Select the jurisdiction before you compute

In Lumex™ the jurisdiction is an input, not an afterthought. Selecting Greece forces PTWS to 1 across every component of the IEC 62305-2:2024 calculation, both where the term appears directly and where it reaches a component through the presence factor, before the calculation runs, so the figures in the report are the Greek figures rather than baseline figures with a note attached. It is applied server side, which is the part that matters on a compliance job: a warning system declared in the inputs cannot pull a Greek assessment below what the regulator permits, because the credit is removed after the input is read and not left to the engineer to remember. The report then prints the departure with its citation, so a reviewer can tell a regulator's rule from a modelling choice. See the Lumex™ platform.

FAQs

Questions answered

Does Greece use IEC 62305?

Yes. Greece applies IEC 62305 through the European adoption EN IEC 62305, published nationally by ELOT, the Hellenic Organization for Standardization. The risk management part appears there as ΕΛΟΤ EN IEC 62305-2:2024. The method, the risk components and the tables are the IEC 62305-2 ones. What differs is a single recorded parameter rule: the foreword of IEC 62305-2:2024, in its list of differing practices at printed p.9, records that Greece takes P_TWS as 1 in every case.

What is P_TWS in IEC 62305-2?

P_TWS is the factor for a thunderstorm warning system. It is the probability that such a system misses a lightning event in the area it watches, so a value below 1 is what claims credit for having one. Clause B.1 NOTE 2 adds the timing point: a warning that arrives too late to act on counts as no warning, and P_TWS is then 1. Clause B.2 NOTE 1 takes P_TWS as 1 when there is no warning system, when evacuation is not assured, or when the maker gives no failure to warn ratio (FTWR). It is a probability term, not a risk component. It enters six Annex B probabilities directly, and it reaches the presence factor P_P through equation (B.14) NOTE 2.

Which parts of the calculation does P_TWS enter?

Six probabilities carry a P_TWS term: P_AT in equation (B.2), P_AD in equation (B.3), P_U in equation (B.10), P_V in equation (B.11), P_W in equation (B.12) and P_Z in equation (B.13). Those drive the risk components R_AT, R_AD, R_U, R_V, R_W and R_Z. Equations (B.4) P_B, (B.5) P_C and (B.6) P_M carry no P_TWS term, but that does not leave R_B, R_C and R_M out of reach. Table 3 builds their loss of life parts R_B1, R_C1 and R_M1 with the presence factor P_P, and equation (B.14) NOTE 2 scales the presence time t_z by P_TWS where a warning lets people leave. Table E.3 footnote g also applies P_TWS to losses inside the fence. So where an evacuation credit was claimed, the Greek rule reaches those three as well. Where none was claimed, forcing P_TWS to 1 leaves them unchanged.

What does P_TWS = 1 change in a Greek assessment?

It removes the credit a thunderstorm warning system would otherwise earn. Because P_TWS is the probability that the system fails, holding it at 1 leaves the six directly affected probabilities at their unreduced value, which raises R_AT, R_AD, R_U, R_V, R_W and R_Z and therefore the total risk R. Where a warning had earned an evacuation credit through the presence factor P_P, the loss of life parts of R_B, R_C and R_M lose that credit too. In Lumex™, holding P_TWS at 1 removes any warning system credit, so the affected figures can only stay the same or rise. A structure sitting just below the tolerable value on the strength of a declared warning system sits above it once the credit is removed.

How is the Greek rule different from the German one?

Both countries force P_TWS to 1, but Greece's rule is blanket and Germany's is per component. Greece forces P_TWS to 1 for every component. Germany names six, the fire, internal system and line terms, and leaves the three injury terms alone: touch and step voltage near the structure (R_AT), a person struck on the structure (R_AD), and touch voltage from a connected line (R_U). The German rule still acts on R_B, R_C and R_M, through the presence factor P_P and Table E.3 footnote g. So the gap between the two is those three injury components, and a Greek assessment also loses any warning system credit in them.

Is a thunderstorm warning system pointless in Greece?

No. It means the system does not earn a reduction in the IEC 62305-2 risk calculation as applied in Greece. A warning system that gets people away from an exposed area still does that, and it remains worth having on its own merits and under whatever safety regulation governs the site. The departure is about how the risk arithmetic treats the system, not about whether it works.

Is the tolerable risk different in Greece?

IEC 62305-2:2024 clause 7.3 NOTE 1 gives R_T = 1 × 10⁻⁵ per year as a representative value of tolerable risk, and allows another value once the case has been investigated in detail. The Introduction of IEC 62305-2:2024 (printed p.12) lets national or local regulation fix R_T, F_T and the Annex A, B, C and E calculation rules and parameter values. No Greek value is recorded in the standard itself. Lumex™ applies the representative 10⁻⁵ for Greece. If a specification or authority fixes another value, record it and compare the result against it outside the tool. Choosing that value is a judgement for the engineer and the authority having jurisdiction, not something the standard supplies.

What Lumex™ does, and what stays with you

Lumex™ computes the method of the standard you choose, IEC 62305-2:2024, AS 1768:2021 or NFPA 780-2026, and shows the working. It does not certify a structure. You may not issue or submit a Lumex™ output until a competent person, qualified where the structure is located, has reviewed the inputs and the result and signed it.

The tolerable risk in IEC 62305-2 is not a fixed constant. Clause 7.3 NOTE 1 gives RT = 1 × 10⁻⁵ per year as a representative value of tolerable risk and adds that another value may be set once the case has been investigated in detail. The standard's introduction then lets national or local regulations fix RT, the tolerable frequency of damage FT, and the Annex A, B, C and E calculation rules and parameter values. Every IEC 62305-2 assessment in Lumex™ states the jurisdiction it was computed under and the values that applied.

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The Greek departure applied by profile, with no workbook to fork