How Lumex™ verifies its risk engines
What each engine is checked against
All three Annex F case studies
The house, office and hospital studies, each unprotected and protected, compared with the printed collection areas, dangerous events, risk components, zone risks and frequencies of damage, within 1.5 percent.
The tool and Figures C.2 to C.8
400 cases computed by the Lightning Risk Assessment Tool v5.0, the case saved in its workbook, and every risk printed in the seven worked examples of Appendix C, all matched exactly.
An independent implementation
Nine cases computed by a separate implementation of Annex L, written from the annex rather than from the engine. The 2026 annex prints no full worked example to compare with.
The Annex F case studies
Annex F prints to three significant figures and warns in F.1 that rounded intermediate values move the last digit. So each check allows 1.5 percent of the printed figure, or half of the last printed digit where the annex prints too few digits for a percentage to be meaningful. Risks are printed in units of 10⁻⁵ per year, and the tables below keep that unit.
The house
A house of 15 by 20 by 6 m with an NSG of 8, no lightning protection system, and an aerial power line and an aerial telephone line. The study protects it with SPDs of LPL IV at the entrance of both lines.
| Figure checked | Published | Annex F table | Verdict the study reaches |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collection area AD | 2.58 × 10³ m² | Table F.4 | - |
| Direct flashes ND | 2.06 × 10⁻² per year | Table F.5 | - |
| Risk R, unprotected | 1.793 | Table F.8 | Above RT = 10⁻⁵, protection needed |
| Risk R, with SPDs at the entrance | 0.149 | Table F.9 | Below RT |
The office building
A reinforced concrete office of 20 by 40 by 25 m with an NSG of 4 in a suburban area, five risk zones, and a buried power line in a high-voltage and a low-voltage section. The study protects it with a Class II LPS, SPDs at the power line entrance and coordinated SPDs of LPL II on both internal systems.
| Zone | Risk R, unprotected (Table F.21) | Risk R, protected (Table F.23) |
|---|---|---|
| Z1, entrance outside | 0.002 | Approximately 0 |
| Z2, roof | 2.259 | 0.113 |
| Z3, archive | 6.526 | 0.592 |
| Z4, offices | 0.202 | 0.018 |
| Z5, computer centre | 0.156 | 0.014 |
The frequency of damage is checked too. Each of the three inner zones prints F = 0.584 per year unprotected (Table F.22), above the owner's FT of 5 × 10⁻², and 0.014 per year once protected (Table F.24). The protected frequency only reproduces when the SPDs on both the power and the telecom system are counted, as clause 8.5.1 combines them, which is one of the checks that separates a full implementation from a simplified one. The collection areas and dangerous events of Tables F.13 and F.14 are checked as well.
The hospital
A reinforced concrete hospital of 50 by 150 by 10 m with an NSG of 8 in a suburban area, five risk zones and a buried power line. The study protects it with a Class II LPS, bonding at the power line entrance, a warning notice on the roof and coordinated SPDs.
| Zone | Risk, unprotected (Table F.35) | Risk, protected (Table F.37) |
|---|---|---|
| Z1, entrance outside (RAT) | 0.036 | 0.002 |
| Z2, roof (RAD) | 18.357 | 0.092 |
| Z3, rooms block (R) | 36.528 | 0.692 |
| Z4, operating block (R) | 108.834 | 0.266 |
| Z5, intensive care (R) | 306.787 | 0.685 |
Each protected zone falls to or below RT = 10⁻⁵. The frequency of damage drops from 0.325 per year in Z3 and 0.306 in Z4 and Z5 (Table F.36) to 0.0032 and 0.0006 (Table F.38). Every risk component that Tables F.35 and F.37 print for a zone is checked on its own, so a correct total cannot hide two errors that cancel.
The risk tool and the Appendix C examples
- 400 tool cases. Seeded input combinations, each computed by the tool itself, including sites with no power service and sites with no other overhead or underground lines. The engine must agree with the tool to the last bit.
- The workbook's own saved case. The results Microsoft Excel computed and saved in the tool as distributed, which proves the engine against the tool's native evaluator.
- Figures C.2 to C.8. The seven worked examples printed in Appendix C. Every printed risk, the direct, indirect and total figure in all four loss categories, and the strike frequencies, are compared as the printed text.
The AS 1768:2021 worked examples Lumex™ reproduces
| Worked example | Risk of loss of human life, as printed | Direct flashes per year, as printed |
|---|---|---|
| Figure C.2, office block, unprotected | 9.10E-05 | 0.166 |
| Figure C.3, office block, protected | 6.24E-06 | 0.166 |
| Figure C.4, hotel in Darwin | 5.92E-06 | 0.062 |
| Figure C.5, historic church | 6.23E-06 | 0.542 |
| Figure C.6, remote pump station | 1.49E-09 | 0.001 |
| Figure C.7, two-storey house | 8.94E-06 | 0.007 |
| Figure C.8, mountaintop broadcasting site | 3.01E-06 | 3.009 |
An independent implementation, until a worked example exists
Instead, the NFPA engine is compared with nine cases computed by a separate implementation of Annex L, written from the register of Annex L values rather than from the engine. Each case goes in through the same validation an assessment uses. The two implementations multiply in a different order, so the comparison allows a relative difference of 10⁻¹² and nothing more. For the method itself, read NFPA 780 Annex L, section by section.
What verification does not cover
A passing check proves the engine applies the method as printed. It does not prove the inputs are right, and it does not reach parts of a standard that print no worked figures.
The inputs are the engineer's
The structure, its surroundings, its lines, the losses and the protection measures come from the person running the assessment. Every report shows them, so a reviewer can check them as well as the arithmetic.
Paths the examples do not reach
Annex F does not exercise every option in IEC 62305-2:2024, such as each national departure. Those paths are covered by tests that cite the clause or table each value comes from, rather than by a printed example.
The design is not certified
For how the edition a figure was computed on becomes part of the answer, read the edition is part of the answer; for what a reviewer checks before a report is signed, read the engineer signs, a reviewer checks.
Questions answered
Does Lumex™ reproduce the IEC 62305-2 Annex F case studies?
How close do Lumex™'s figures need to be to the published ones?
Does Lumex™ match the AS 1768 risk assessment tool?
Is the NFPA 780 engine verified against a published worked example?
Does verification mean Lumex™ replaces engineering judgement?
The tolerable risk in IEC 62305-2 is not a fixed constant.
Clause 7.3 NOTE 1 gives RT = 1 × 10⁻⁵ per year as a
representative value of tolerable risk and adds that another value may be set once
the case has been investigated in detail. Printed p.12 then lets national or local regulations fix
RT, the tolerable frequency of damage FT